Gordon’s Flank Attack: Lost Opportunity in the Wilderness

Announcing Our 528th Meeting
Date: Saturday, April 14

Gordon’s Flank Attack: Lost Opportunity in the Wilderness

         Presented by Greg Mertz

We welcome back Greg Mertz, who serves as the supervisory historian at Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Military Park.  He has been our guide on several of our field trips to eastern battlefields and has spoken at our meetings before as well.  Greg Mertz was born and raised near St. Louis, Missouri.  His interest in the Civil War began and grew out of annual hiking and camping trips the scout troop made to the Shiloh, Tennessee battlefield every spring.  He holds a bachelor’s degree from the University of Missouri and a master’s from Shippensburg University in Pennsylvania.  His 37 year career with the National Park Service began with four years at Gettysburg National Military Park and Eisenhower National Historic Site followed by 33 years at Fredericksburg.  He has written four feature articles for Blue and Gray Magazine on the Battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania Court House and has an upcoming book in the Emerging Civil War Series titled Attack at Daylight and Whip Them: The Battle of Shiloh, April 6-7, 1862.
  

       Gordon’s Flank Attack: Lost Opportunity in the Wilderness

The final attack during the May 5-6, 1864 Battle of the Wilderness, was not simply a small portion of the first showdown between Robert E. Lee and Ulysses S. Grant.  For Confederate General John B. Gordon, of whom the attack is named, the dusk attack was a lost opportunity – and one of several such chances blown by the Confederates that he observed during the course of the war.   Gordon felt that the situation in the Wilderness was similar to a missed opportunity he had experienced at Gettysburg, as well as a pair of other prime chances the Confederates had during subsequent battles later in 1864.  In addition to observing similarities among the several lost opportunities, Gordon also noticed parallels in the decision-making process for the attacks that failed to accomplish all that Gordon felt the Confederates could have achieved.  Some combination of Generals Gordon, Richard S. Ewell and Jubal A. Early were involved in the discussions regarding lost opportunities, and Gordon blamed these superiors for failing to make attacks that did not reach their potential.  We will examine how Gordon’s Flank Attack in the Wilderness tells us about more than just a sliver of the battle, but illuminates our understanding of the inner workings of a key portion of the Army of Northern Virginia.